GRCs: How do they affect elections?

On 1 December 1987, The Straits Times headline floated: “Team MPs for Next Election. System Will Ensure Multi-Racial Politics”. By 1988, the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) system would eventually be introduced. Through this system, candidates contest an election in teams of three to six members, with at least one candidate from a minority community.

While the policy was originally established to ensure sufficient minority representation in Parliament, political observers have questioned the efficacy of the electoral mechanism over the years after watching the system work in practice. Observers argue that the GRC system presents obstacles to fair competitive elections at the expense of voters¹. These include the constraining of voter choice and institutionalisation of barriers to entry for opposition parties. As an outcome of the system, intra- and inter-political competition for the benefit of constituencies is suppressed, while the quality of political representation for constituents hangs in the balance.

1. GRC has a winner-takes-all effect, facilitating the entry of untested candidates

When voters cast their ballots in a GRC, they are effectively voting for the entire team rather than individual candidates. If the team wins the election in that GRC, all members of the team are elected to parliament, regardless of their individual performance, qualifications, or attributes. NUS Constitutional Law expert Kevin Tan argues that this system allows untested candidates to enter parliament by riding on the coattails of stronger team members².

The table below shows the PAP contestants for all GRCs contested in GE2020. The PAP often places an anchor minister and another senior PAP politician in each constituency, typically accompanied by one or two new candidates.

PAP contestants in GE2020
Aljunied GRC	Victor Lye	Chua Eng Leong	Shamsul Kamar	Alex Yeo	Chan Hui Yuh
Ang Mo Kio GRC	Lee Hsien Loong	Gan Thiam Poh	Darryl David	Ng Ling Ling [New]	Nadia Ahmad Samdin  [New]
Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC	Ng Eng Hen	Chee Hong Tat	Chong Kee Hiong	Saktiandi Supaat
Chua Chu Kang GRC	Gan Kim Yong	Low Yen Ling	Don Wee [New]	Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim [New]
East Coast GRC	Heng Swee Keat	Maliki Osman	Jessica Tan	Cheryl Chan	Tan Kiat How  [New]
Holland-Bukit Timah GRC	Vivian Balakrishnan	Christopher De Souza	Sim Ann	Edward Chia [New]
Jalan Besar GRC	Josephine Teo	Heng Chee How	Denise Phua	Wan Rizal  [New]
Jurong GRC	Tharman Shanmugaratnam	Rahayu Mahzam	Tan Wu Meng	Xie Yao Quan  [New; replaced Ivan Lim]	Shawn Huang  [New]
Marine Parade GRC	Tan Chuan-Jin	Seah Kian Peng	Edwin Tong	Mohd Fahmi Aliman [New]	Tan See Leng  [New]
Marsiling-Yew Tee GRC	Lawrence Wong	Zaqy Mohamad	Alex Yam	Hany Soh [New]
Nee Soon GRC	K. Shanmugam	Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim	Louis Ng	Derrick Goh [New]	Carrie Tan [New]
Pasir Ris-Punggol	Teo Chee Hean	Janil Puthucheary	Sharael Taha [New]	Yeo Wan Ling [New]	Desmond Tan [New]
Sembawang GRC	Ong Ye Kung	Lim Wee Kiak	Vikram Nair	Marian Jaafar [New]	Poh Li San  [New]
Sengkang GRC	Ng Chee Meng	Lam Pin Min	Amrin Amin	Raymond Lye  [New]
Tampines GRC	Masagos Zulkifli	Baey Yam Keng	Cheng Li Hui	Desmond Choo	Koh Poh Koon
Tanjong Pagar GRC	Chan Chun Sing	Indranee Rajah	Joan Pereira	Eric Chua [New]	Alvin Tan  [New]
West Coast GRC	S. Iswaran	Desmond Lee	Ang Wei Neng	Foo Mee Har	Rachel Ong  [New]

The GRC system also tends to benefit the incumbent party as it allows ‘tested’ candidates with stronger profiles to lead election teams. These established candidates, often holding significant political positions such as ministers, lend considerable weight to the team. In contrast, opposition teams typically do not have the same level of access to high-profile, experienced politicians. They may struggle to field ‘tested’ candidates with comparable influence and recognition, making it harder to compete against the incumbent party’s teams.

The GRC system also allows candidates who have previously failed to secure a parliamentary seat in Single Member Constituencies (SMCs) to re-enter parliament through a team-based election.³ For example, Koh Poh Koon made his electoral debut in the 2013 by-elections in Punggol East SMC but lost to the Workers’ Party’s Lee Li Lian. However, in the 2015 General Election, Koh contested as part of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s team in Ang Mo Kio GRC. The team won the election, enabling Koh to enter parliament despite his earlier individual defeat. 

However, this winner-takes-all effect of GRC can also benefit the opposition by allowing them to remove an entire team of PAP candidates in one constituency. For example, in the 2011 General Election, the Workers’ Party won Aljunied GRC, dislodging a PAP slate that included three political office-holders and one new candidate. 

The GRC system also provides a platform for untested candidates to enter parliament and prove their worth over time, contributing to the development of the current core 4G leaders. For example, Heng Swee Keat contested in GE2011 under Tampines GRC, which was led by Mah Bow Tan. Heng subsequently became the Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister. Similarly, Chan Chun Sing contested in GE2011 under Tanjong Pagar GRC, which was led by Lee Kuan Yew and had an uncontested walkover. Chan Chun Sing has since held numerous significant positions and is currently the Minister of Education.

2. GRCs disadvantage smaller parties and make election results less representative

The GRC system also disadvantages smaller parties. One way is in creating a barrier to entry for smaller political parties to contest in the GE as they may be hard-pressed to field a quality team, or identify sufficient minority candidates. The number of members in the GRC has increased from 3 to 4 members in 1991 and 4 to 6 members in 1996. In addition, 3-MP GRC no longer exists since 1991. Theoretically, this further raises the barriers to entry, as an even greater number of political candidates are required to form a team to compete in certain constituencies.

In the beginning, this new system meant that opposition parties had to collaborate with each other to optimise their limited number of candidates. For example, Barisan Sosialis (BS) and Singapore United Front (SUF) merged with Workers’ Party (WP) to pool candidates.⁴

Tan notes that opposition political parties struggled to make a quality team for many years, especially between 1991 and 2011. This is especially since the Constitutional amendments made between 1988 to 1996 to increase the number of team members in each GRC were made just shortly before the general elections. While there is nothing in the Singapore Constitution requiring Parliament to treat all political parties with fairness, principles of natural justice require that sufficient notice of major changes be given to all parties contesting general elections.^{5 6}

These barriers to entry may account for the fact that it was not until GE2015 that all GRCs were contested. This also means that from 1988 to 2011, a total of 60 GRCs were up for election, with 35 of them, or 58%, being uncontested walkovers.

In the recent parliamentary debates on the GRC system, PSP NCMP Leong Mun Wai raised the post-GE1991 changes as an example of PAP using the GRC system to its political advantage. He highlighted that “while then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong had attributed the change to the set-up of community development councils which needed economies of scale and a critical mass of residents, “many Singaporeans, including myself, have never been convinced by this reasoning”.⁸

However, changes have been made. Prior to the 2011 elections, the EBRC decreased the average number of MPs per GRC from 5.4 to 5. The number of six-member GRCs was also reduced, from 5 to 2, while the SMCs increased from 9 to 12.

Another way in which GRCs disadvantages smaller parties is in distorting the relationship between votes to seats, as Tan and Grofman (2018) argue. The idea here is simple: even though smaller parties may not be strong nationally, they may have areas of local strength that are sufficient to win individual SMCs. However, this strength becomes “submerged” when constituencies are grouped together to be GRCs, resulting in a “mechanical advantage” to the largest party. As a case in point, although the PAP won 61.2% of the popular vote, it won 89.2% of the elected seats in Parliament at the 2020 general election. 

That said, it is arguable whether parties have particular strengths in different regions of Singapore, given that it is a small country, and the racial quotas of the HDB system have minimized the formation of enclaves. As an additional counterpoint that the GRC system may not be driving the disproportionate distribution of seats, the 1984 general election saw the PAP win only 64.8% of the vote, yet win 97.5% of the seats.

3. GRCs worsens perceived “gerrymandering” effect of electoral boundary changes

Combined with the effect of electoral boundary changes, Opposition Parties are also further disadvantaged. Candidates are only informed of such redrawing a few months before elections. This means that aspiring political candidates who have been ‘working the ground’ may sometimes find their ‘ground’ being swept up from under them.

This has led to criticisms of “gerrymandering”. Gerrymandering refers to the manipulation of boundaries of an electoral constituency, to change the number of electors within the area, so as to favour one political party or person. As the boundaires of our constituencies are constantly re-drawn without strong explanations, it has been accused as an act of gerrymandering.

This practice reduces political competition and increases partisan bias, exacerbated by the short lead time between the announcement of new electoral boundaries and nomination of candidates.

Non-incumbents may also face more challenges arising from the lack of sufficient time to react to changes in electoral boundaries. In addition to the lack of explanation for the drawing of electoral boundaries, the interval between announcement of revised electoral boundaries and the calling of elections since independence has been decreasing over the years. This means that political candidates may not have sufficient time to re-strategise and organise to compete effectively, especially when the area they have been working on has been impacted by the announcement of new boundaries.

Table from New Naratif (link)

Workers’ Party’s Sylvia Lim summarised this challenge in the parliament back in 2010: “The entire electoral boundary re-drawing process is completely shrouded in secrecy, chaired by the Secretary to the Cabinet. There are no public hearings, no minutes of meeting published. The revised boundaries are released weeks or even days before Nomination Day. The report makes no attempt to explain why certain single seats are retained while others are dissolved, nor why new GRCs are created or old ones reshaped.”

The EBRC has yet to provide detailed explanations for their recommendations which includes changes to electoral boundaries. The report of the EBRC 2020 highlighted the terms of reference that formed the basis for the appointment of the Committee. One of the terms states “The Committee should take into consideration significant increases or decreases in the number of electors in the current electoral divisions as a result of population shifts and housing development since the last boundary delineation exercise.”

There are no further explanations beyond the fact that the changes to the electoral boundaries considered changes in the number of electors as a result of population shifts and housing development. What are the population shifts and housing development for each constituency? How does the EBRC justify the ‘absorption’ of an SMC into a GRC?

Recently, Gerald Giam of the Workers’ Party enquired if the Prime Minister will require the EBRC to provide detailed reasons for each constituency boundary change, beyond the considerations for constituencies’ sizes, to ensure fair representation and the need for adjustments as a result of population shifts. Minister Chan Chun Sing responded that the committee independently considers the relevant data before making its recommendations. He added that “it will not be practicable for the EBRC to explain the technicalities and details of every change that it recommends.”⁹

Without full, detailed explanations, significant changes that influence parity of electoral competition cannot be properly scrutinised and leads to criticisms of gerrymandering.

5. The GRC system allows vacant seats to be left unfilled when MPs quit midterm, contributing to inadequate representation.

In the 14th Parliament, there are six empty seats and no by-elections has been called.

There is no legal requirement to call for a by-election when an elected MP in a GRC resigns. Section 24(2A) of the Parliamentary Elections Act 1954 provides that no writ of election may be issued to fill the vacancy unless all the Members for that constituency have vacated their seats.

In July 2023, Lee Hsien Loong has said that “in the GRCs where there is a member missing, the other members of the GRC will step up and will make sure that the constituents are well looked after, that’s one of the advantages of having a GRC.”¹⁰

Nevertheless, it is also important to note other impacts of vacant GRC seat(s) in the parliament:

A. Impacts on minority representation

1. Four of the six vacant seats were perviously occupied by minority race MPs: Raeesah Khan, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Leon Perera, and S Iswaran.
2. The GRC system was established in 1988 to ensure that the minority racial communities in Singapore will always be represented in Parliament. At least one of the MPs in the group representing a GRC must belong to a minority racial community, either the Malay community or the Indian and other minority communities.

B. Impacts on constituency representation

Associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore (NUS) Chong Ja Ian notes that constituents will not have someone directly representing them and their interests in Parliament. ¹¹ Constitutional law expert and NUS adjunct law professor Kevin Tan notes that in terms of political representation, this would be a kind of “malapportionment”, which could be “bad for the system and ultimately unfair”.¹²

C. Impacts on MPs fulfilling their mandate

Kevin Tan further notes that “Of course, the MPs covering will tell you that it is doable, but, technically, constituents sharing MPs will get less attention, whether it is half an MP or two-thirds of an MP or whatever.”¹³ Questions remain if constituents feel they are adequately served, be it in Meet-the-People sessions or town council management issues.

6. Continued debates over the efficacy of the GRC system for minority representation

Since the introduction of the GRC system in 1988, many political observers have debated its role, benefits, and relevance today. 

In 1989, Goh Chok Tong argued that the GRC was necessary to ensure multiracial representation in Parliament. He noted that voting trends indicated that more Singaporeans were voting along ethnic lines. Given the Chinese majority in Singapore, Goh was concerned that this trend would lead to a lack of minority ethnic communities represented in Parliament.¹⁴ 

However, minority communities, particularly the Malays, were divided on the role and benefits of the GRC. While the GRC system seeks to ensure minority representation in Parliament, those who objected to it claimed that the practice could simultaneously institutionalize ethnic Malays to become a permanent political minority.¹⁵ 

Moreover, Norshahril Saat noted that the fear that Singaporeans will vote along racial lines might be overstated today.¹⁶ Voting patterns suggest that a candidates’ ethnicity does not affect voters’ choices. In the 2011 GE, Eurasian lawyer Michael Palmer won 54.54% of votes in Punggol East SMC, while Chinese candidates Lee Li Lian and Desmond Lim, won 41.01% and 4.45% of seats respectively. While one could argue that three-cornered fights favor the PAP,  this case also demonstrates that ethnicity is not a key consideration for voters.Minority candidates have also led their GRCs to victory. Notable examples include anchor minister Dr Yaacob Ibrahim who led the PAP team to win seats in the Jalan Besar GRC–a Chinese (76.4%) majority constituency– in the 2015 GE. Likewise, anchor minister K. Shanmugam led his Nee Soon GRC team to electoral victory in the 2015 GE, winning 66.7% of the votes. Tharman Shanmugaratnam, anchor minister for Jurong GRC, also led his team to receive the highest percentage of votes compared to other GRCs, including Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s Ang Mo Kio GRC and Teo Chee Hean’s Pasir Ris Punggol GRC. These electoral results suggest that Singaporeans assess politicians based on factors apart from ethnicity, such as “the ability to listen at ground level, moderate political outlook, and humility.”

7. A trend towards smaller GRC sizes

Amid the enduring criticisms of the GRC system, there have been reforms aimed at creating smaller GRCs and increasing SMCs. Two of the terms of reference of the EBRC in 2020 were to create smaller Group Representation Constituencies, so as to further reduce the average size of the Group Representation Constituencies, and to have more than the current 13 Single Member Constituencies.¹⁷ As a result, GE2020 saw the removal of six-member GRCs and the average number of MPs per GRC was 4.65, a drop from an average of 4.75 MPs per GRC in GE2015. Critics note that this might be a reflection of the fact that GRCs are no longer as unassailable, since the loss of the first GRC in the watershed 2011 elections: losing a GRC might now result in losing an entire slate of 6 candidates, thus presenting a big risks to the ruling party.

References

1. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/grc-system-used-for-benefit-of-pap-and-should-be-abolished-say-psp-s-leong-mun-wai-and-hazel-poa ↩︎
2. https://link-springer-com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/chapter/10.1007/978-981-13-1556-5_12 ↩︎
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4. https://sg.news.yahoo.com/comment-the-history-of-the-group-representation-constituency-082214393.html ↩︎
5. https://link-springer-com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/chapter/10.1007/978-981-13-1556-5_12#ref-CR38 ↩︎
6. https://link-springer-com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/chapter/10.1007/978-981-13-1556-5_12#ref-CR27 ↩︎
7. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/1991-solid-endorsement-eludes-pm-goh ↩︎
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9. Electoral Boundaries Review Committee has not been convened: Chan Chun Sing | The Straits Times ↩︎
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11. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/five-empty-seats-in-parliament-is-unprecedented-what-does-this-mean-for-s-pore-politics ↩︎
12. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/five-empty-seats-in-parliament-is-unprecedented-what-does-this-mean-for-s-pore-politics ↩︎
13. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/five-empty-seats-in-parliament-is-unprecedented-what-does-this-mean-for-s-pore-politics ↩︎
14. Mutalib, Hussin. “Constitutional‐Electoral Reforms and Politics in Singapore.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (November 2002): 665. https://doi.org/10.2307/3598663. ↩︎
15. Mutalib, Hussin. “Constitutional‐Electoral Reforms and Politics in Singapore.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (November 2002): 665. https://doi.org/10.2307/3598663. ↩︎
16. Saat, Norshahril. “Singapore Beyond Ethnicity: Rethinking the Group Representative Constituency Scheme.” The Round Table 105, no. 2 (March 3, 2016): 202. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2016.1154386. ↩︎
17. https://www.eld.gov.sg/pdf/White_Paper_on_the_Report_of_the_Electoral_Boundaries_Review_Committee_2020.pdf ↩︎